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Economic Aspects of Turkey’s Quest for EU Membership 
Daniel Gros* 
 
Introduction 
The EU has now decided to open membership 
negotiations with Turkey in late 2005. Given the 
determination with which Turkey has pursued the 
goal of EU membership, it is likely that these 
negotiations will in the end lead to accession. But 
this will not happen quickly; 2015 is the most 
likely date of membership often mentioned on 
both sides. Nevertheless, even if one accepts this 
time frame, it is worthwhile exploring the 
economic dimension of Turkey’s accession. 
The EU has by now acquired a lot of experience 
in admitting poorer countries. Would Turkey 
pose any special challenges (apart from its 
sheer size)? In economic terms, Turkey’s 
accession would in some respects mean ‘just 
another enlargement’, but in others, it would be 
quite different. Accession of Turkey would be 
‘just another enlargement’ in the sense that in 
terms of relative GDP per capita and the 
weight of agriculture in employment, Turkey 
resembles the less-advanced CEECs that have 
already or are about to become EU members. 
Moreover, in terms of economic mass and 
population, Turkey would represent a bit more 
than double the 2007 enlargement (Bulgaria 
and Romania). This applies also to the 
budgetary costs. 
In three aspects, however, the Turkish case is 
quite different:  
•  Advanced trade integration. Through its 
customs union agreement, Turkey is much 
further integrated than were the CEECs until 
they became members. For most practical 
purposes, it is already part of the internal 
market (for goods) and is scheduled to take 
over large parts of the acquis. 
• Low human capital. In terms of indicators of 
formal education, the CEECs are rather close 
to the EU average. Here Turkey clearly lags 
behind – with potentially important 
consequences for its growth prospects. 
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•  Demographic dynamism. The workforce in Turkey will 
continue to grow by more than 1% p.a. for at least 
another generation, whereas it is declining in most 
CEECs, giving Turkey potentially more dynamism. 
There are also two areas in which some similarities at first 
sight disguise important qualitative differences: 
•  Duality of the economy. Turkey’s average GDP per 
capita is similar to that of Bulgaria and Romania, the 
two CEECs scheduled for membership in 2007. But its 
economy is more dualistic, with a small, but rather 
high-performing modern sector (which is as efficient as 
its counterparts in the new member countries). At the 
same time, however, approximately half of its labour 
force has essentially not yet been touched by the 
modern economy.  
•  Migration. The spectre of a massive influx of poor 
Anatolian migrant peasants is one of the most powerful 
obstacles inhibiting a rational discussion of the Turkey 
issue. A key difference in Turkey’s accession 
compared to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements lies in 
the large stock of Turkish citizens who have been 
firmly established for some time in the EU and their 
concentration in one country in particular (Germany). 
This testifies to the fact that (given existing regulations 
on family reunification) a substantial net flow of 
migrants is taking place even at present (with no formal 
mobility for workers). 
With these considerations as background, this 
contribution discusses the following issues: Section 1 
starts with the question that weighs heavy on everyone’s 
mind: how much will Turkey’s accession cost? The next 
section then deals with the one area where Turkish-EU 
relations are already very deep, namely trade. This is 
followed by an examination of the human potential of the 
Turkish economy, its dynamic demography, its low level 
of human capital accumulation and its dual employment 
structure (Section 3). Section 4 draws the analysis 
together for an evaluation of the long-term growth 
prospects. Section 5 deals with migration. 
1.  How much will it cost? 
How much will Turkish membership cost the then 
incumbent members? This question is at one and the same 
time both straightforward and impossible to answer. It is 
impossible in the sense that the EU is constantly evolving 
so that it is difficult to predict with any precision the 
financial consequences of Turkey’s accession, say in 
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2014. It is straightforward exercise, however, to calculate 
how much Turkey would cost the EU budget if it were to 
enter under present rules. 
Key factors determining the EU budget are the financial 
envelopes set by a multi-annual framework called 
financial perspectives. The current framework, which was 
decided among the EU-15 in 2000, and thus long before 
the current enlargement, runs until 2006. The next 
framework, which is being negotiated à 25, will run until 
2013. By that time Turkey is not likely to have already 
become a member country so that it will have only a 
limited influence for the following financial framework, 
which would run until 2020. Assuming accession by 2015 
this would imply that the financial envelope for the first 
three years of Turkey’s membership would have been 
decided by the EU-28 (the current EU-25 plus B, R and 
HR). In this respect the situation of Turkey might thus 
resemble that of Bulgaria and Romania, which are likely 
to join by 2007, so that their first years of membership 
will also be covered by a financial framework in whose 
negotiations they did not participate. 
In terms of negotiations, Turkey would thus become fully 
part of the EU’s financial framework only during the 
2021-2027 round. Given that for all present and former 
member states it took between 5 and 10 years before they 
were integrated into all support programmes, it is thus 
likely that Turkey will benefit fully from the EU’s 
budgetary support schemes only some time after 2020. 
What will determine Turkey’s share in the EU budget in 
the decade of the 2020s are the rules that will by then be 
in effect for everyone else and the level of development 
reached by the EU and Turkey itself. Because no one can 
know with certainty what these rules will be, any long-
term projections are highly speculative. 
In reality, however, the discussion about the financial 
burden Turkey would represent for the EU budget usually 
focuses on the current rules.
1  
Some illustrative calculations 
Many analysts choose the ‘maximum’ that Turkey would 
receive after a transition period under current rules as a 
‘starting point’. There are two variants to this approach: 
                                                      
1 The experience with the current enlargement process 
suggests that over time the discussion will shift from how 
much it will cost to who will bear the (minor) burden. But 
this point is still some way in the future. Current 
circumstances have another impact, however, in that it is 
usually assumed that the burden would have to be borne by 
the current EU-15 because it is usually assumed that most of 
the new member countries will remain net beneficiaries for 
quite some time to come. By the early 2020s, this might no 
longer be the case, but again it is impossible to forecast with 
any precision which of the new member countries would no 
longer qualify for financial support (under current rules) by 
that date. 
a)  How much would Turkey receive if it were a fully 
established member today? 
b)  How much is Turkey likely to receive under current 
rules by a likely accession date, e.g. 2015? 
The overall calculations are actually quite simple in both 
cases since the budget of the EU is dominated by two 
items: Structural Funds (destined for regions with a GDP 
per capita at PPP below 75% of the EU average) and the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The gross receipts of 
any member country are to a large extent determined by 
these two items. Since the results are similar, we will 
concentrate on the second variation. 
When making projections for the year 2015, it does not 
make sense to base the calculations on current euros as 
both the EU and the Turkish economy are likely to grow 
over the next decade. Under the growth prospects 
presented below, Turkey will grow much more quickly 
than the EU over the next decade and Turkish GDP could 
reach about 4% that of the EU-28’s GDP in the middle of 
the next decade (at present it amounts to only a bit above 
2%). This implies immediately that the cost of extending 
current Structural Funds to Turkey would cost at most 
0.16% of EU-28 GDP (=0.04*0.04).  
The calculations for agriculture are potentially more 
complicated since one would have to guess the output 
structure of agriculture in Turkey in about a decade and 
then calculate to what extent this would change if Turkey 
participates in the CAP. This would actually be an 
exceedingly complex operation as one would have to take 
into account the entire input/output matrix (e.g. some 
commodities (maize) are used as an input in the 
production of others (meat)). However, this is not 
necessary as an indirect approach based on support 
relative to production in this sector can yield a better 
result.  
The starting point is that Turkish farmers are likely to 
obtain at most 20% of their value added from the EU’s 
CAP, for the simple reason that this is what farmers in the 
EU-15 obtain today: the CAP costs at present amount to 
0.5% of GDP and the value added produced by 
agriculture is about 2.5% of EU-15 GDP.  
Agriculture produces at present around 12% of GDP in 
Turkey, but taking into account that its share has been 
declining continuously over the last decade, a reasonable 
assumption might be that in about another decade 
agriculture will account for about 10% of Turkish GDP at 
most. On this basis, one can easily calculate the potential 
maximum cost of extending the present rate of support of 
the CAP to Turkey. Assuming, as before, that the Turkish 
economy accounts for 4% of EU GDP (and that 
agriculture contributes 10% to this), the cost of providing 
an ‘equivalent rate of support’ for Turkish agriculture 
would be 0.08% of EU-15 GDP (=02.*0.04*0.1). To 
repeat, this is again an upper bound. Other estimates, 
arrive at much lower numbers: see, for example, Quaisser 
& Reppegather (2004), who argue that the cost of ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TURKEY’S QUEST FOR EU MEMBERSHIP| 3 
extending the CAP to Turkey should only be around 
0.045% of the EU’s GDP.
2 
The gross cost (Structural Funds plus CAP) might thus 
amount to around a quarter of 1% of EU-28 GDP. Against 
the gross receipts one would have to set the contribution 
that Turkey would have to make to the EU budget. At 
present, and this is unlikely to change at any time, all 
member states contribute at the same rate, or rather 
percent of GNP, to the EU budget. The contribution rate 
is equal to the share of the EU budget in overall GDP. 
Assuming that the EU budget will continue to be limited 
to around 1-1.2% of GDP, this implies that Turkey will 
have to contribute about 1.2% of its own GDP to the EU 
budget. Under the assumptions made so far (Turkish GDP 
at about 4% of that of the EU-15), this would then amount 
to around 0.048% of EU-15. 
The ceiling for the net cost should thus be around 0.20% 
of EU GDP (equivalent to about €20 billion given today’s 
EU GDP of around €10,000 billion). Table 1 below 
summarises the main findings. 
Table 1. Maximum budgetary cost, full membership 
  Turkey 2015 in an enlarged 
EU (in % of EU GDP) 
Structural Funds  0.16 
CAP receipts  0.08 
Total receipts  0.25 
Contributions to EU budget  0.05 
(Max) Net receipts for Turkey  0.20 
Source: Own calculations based on current EU budgetary rules and 
regulations. 
                                                      
2 The number calculated above is again an upper limit, as the 
CAP is likely to change over time, inter alia, because of the 
commitments made by the EU in the context of the WTO to 
abolish exports subsidies, and the general limitations the 
WTO imposes on various types of domestic agricultural 
subsidies in general. 
 
2.  A special relationship? Trade integration 
and the EU-Turkey customs union 
Those who argue that Turkey should be offered a ‘special 
relationship’ instead of full EU membership often 
overlook the fact that this special relationship already 
exists in the economic field – namely in the form of a 
customs union – which has been operational for some 
time now. 
The influence of this ‘special relationship’ on the Turkish 
economy is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the 
standard measure of openness, namely the share of 
exports of goods and services in GDP. Looking at the data 
over almost the last half century it is apparent that until 
about 1980, Turkey was effectively a closed economy. 
Exports accounted for only 5% of GDP, much less than 
even in Franco’s Spain (used here as a comparator 
because it is also geographically somewhat on the fringe 
of the EU). Turkey started to open to the rest of the world 
with a first set of reforms during the early 1980s, leading 
basically to an increase of the openness ratio by a factor 
of three, i.e. to 15% of GDP, similar to the values 
recorded by Spain, which was by then joining the old 
European Community. Another factor pushing the 
Turkish economy to open to the rest of the world, with 
exports climbing successively to almost 30% of GDP, 
was the EU-Turkey customs union treaty of 1995. Again, 
this value is close to that of Spain, which has by now been 
part of the internal market for quite some time. 
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Figure 1. Trends in openness for Spain and Turkey 
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Despite this considerable progress, however, Turkey is 
somewhat less dependent on trade with the EU than even 
the larger new member countries. Exports to the EU 
account for ‘only’ 15-16% of Turkey’s GDP, compared to 
over 20% for Poland (the least open of the new member 
states). This lower degree of trade integration is the result 
of two factors. First, the share of trade in GDP is still 
somewhat lower for Turkey than even for a country like 
Poland. Part of this difference might be due to a residual 
protectionist attitude on the part of the bureaucracy that 
has been noted in many Commission reports. But another, 
perhaps equally important factor is Turkey’s geographical 
position (much further away from the core of the EU 
market than most CEECs) which makes it natural that the 
geographical distribution of Turkey’s foreign trade is a bit 
less focused on the EU. 
3.  The human potential of the Turkish 
economy: Dynamic demography coupled 
with insufficient human capital formation 
The success of any economy is ultimately based on its 
people. In this respect Turkey shows some remarkable 
features, which set it apart from most old and new 
member countries. As mentioned above, the first and best 
known difference is the fact that Turkey’s population is 
still growing – whereas that of most member countries is 
already, or is about to start, declining. A second 
difference concerns the educational system, which again 
sets Turkey apart from most member states. Finally, a 
third difference arises from the dual nature of the Turkish 
economy with its stark difference between those working 
in a strong modern sectors and the remainder, whose 
productivity is very low. 
Demographic dynamics 
In contrast to the situation in most member countries, 
Turkey’s population is still growing, but the rate of 
increase has already slowed considerably compared to the 
last decades. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the 
population of Turkey and that of the four largest member 
countries. It is apparent that ‘old’ Europe has been either 
stagnating (Germany and Italy), or growing rather slowly 
over the last 30 years. By contrast, the population of 
Turkey has doubled over this period. The available 
projections imply, however, that Turkey’s demographic 
growth will moderate in the future. For the next two 
decades the population of Turkey is thus forecasted to 
grow by another 25%, which represents a much lower 
growth rate than that of the past, but which should be 
compared to the declining populations forecast for 
Germany and Italy. For the next generation, Turkey will 
thus remain much more dynamic in population terms than 
all other member countries. 
Whilst being more dynamic Turkey is also in the midst of 
a demographic transition, reflecting a fairly rapid decline 
of the population growth rate, from the 2.5 to 3.0% range 
in the 1950s and 1960s, to close to less than 1.5%, at the 
beginning of the new century. This implies a rising 
proportion of the 15 to 64 age group in the total 
population, as fewer new babies are born to fill the below-
15 age group, and as life expectancy, while lengthening, 
is not yet long enough to result in a large proportion of the 
total population above age 64. 
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Figure 3 above shows the demographic bonus in the form 
of the change in the share of the total population that 
could be potentially active (i.e. those between 25 and 65). 
The level of this ratio measures in a certain sense 
potential GDP per capita. Changes in this ratio show, 
ceteris paribus, to what extent the room for re-distribution 
is affected by demography. For example, if this ratio 
increases by 1%, potential GDP per capita should go up 
by 1% ceteris paribus, i.e. holding constant productivity, 
employment rates, etc. A fall in this ratio indicates the 
opposite, a potential decrease in GDP per capita, implying 
that there is less to re-distribute to pensioners and other 
interest groups.The large hump shaped curve of Turkey 
puts it well above the average for the EU-15, whose curve 
is declining all the time and will even turn negative over 
the next decade. Turkey is in this respect also better off 
than all current and prospective member countries, taken 
individually because their demographic ‘transition’ 
happened a generation earlier. Even the poorer among the 
EU-15 had their demographic transition earlier. The 
Spanish and Portuguese curves would be below that of 
Turkey and anticipate its movements by about 20 years.
3 
Turkey can thus rely on a strong demographic bonus. The 
size of this bonus can be read directly from the figure: it 
was about 1.5% per annum in the five-year period 
preceding 2005, implying that each year the working age 
population increased by 1.5% more than the total 
population (allowing, ceteris paribus, as explained above, 
for an increase in potential GDP per capita of 1.5%). On 
                                                      
3 Poland is a special case because of the horrendous losses 
the country suffered during World War II. This implies that 
until 2015 there will be each year fewer pensioners falling 
out of the labour force. However, after 2015, the low birth 
rates will make themselves felt in rapidly deteriorating 
demographic situation.  
this count Turkey has clearly a strong advantage over the 
EU-15 (and even the poorer EU member countries). 
An expanding population provides an economic 
opportunity only if employment increases as well. This 
does not seem to have been the case for Turkey so far. 
Table 2 describes the basic age structure and employment 
ratios in Turkey and selected new member countries that 
are used here as comparators because employment rates 
tend to go up with income. The key result is that the ratio 
of total employment to total population is substantially 
below (almost one third lower) that in the comparator 
countries, because of a lower ratio of the 15 to 64 age 
group as well as a lower participation rate. Similar 
differences in labour force participation rates also exist 
among the EU-15, with generally the highest value to be 
found among the Scandinavian countries. But Turkey 
would find itself at the lower end even of the ‘Southern’ 
group within the EU. One explanation for the lower 
employment ratio of the population in working age in 
Turkey constitutes the very low labour market 
participation rates of women.  
To sum up: The Turkish population in working age has 
grown rapidly, but employment has not, leading to the 
low employment ratios documented above. This is a 
pattern that needs to be broken if Turkey is to use its 
demographic bonus. 
 
Figure 3. Demographic bonus 
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Table 2. Employment, 15-64 age group and total employment/ population, (15/64 age group), 2002 
Employment 
(thousands) 
(15-64) Age Group/ 
Total Pop 
Total Emp./ (15-64) 
Age Group 
Total Employment/ 
Total Pop   
(1) (2) (3) (4)** 
Bulgaria 2998  0.68  0.55  0.37 
Czech Rep.  4760  0.70  0.67  0.46 
Hungary 3855  0.68  0.55  0.37 
Poland 13782  0.67  0.52  0.35 
Romania 7745  0.68  0.52  0.35 
Turkey *  20836  0.64  0.44  0.28 
Source: Calculated from EUROSTAT, SY, SIS. 
* Year 2000. 
** (4)=(2)x(3). 
 
Human capital accumulation 
For economic growth, it is not the quantity, but the quality 
that counts. In other words the economic potential 
depends crucially on the quality of the actual and 
potential work force in terms of its ‘human capital’. On 
this score Turkey starts from a weak position. Tables 3 
and 4 below show the relevant data concerning both how 
investment in formal schooling takes place and the output 
in terms of educational achievements. It is apparent that 
Turkey is investing relatively little in education, less than 
most, but the poorest EU member states. The difference 
would be even larger if one takes into account that the 
share of the schooling age population is so much higher in 
Turkey.  
Table 3. Total expenditure on education and adult 
population with upper secondary education 
  Total expenditure 
on education 
as % of GDP 
% of adult population 
with upper secondary 
education 
Turkey  3.91 24.3 
Poland  5.31 45.9 
Portugal  5.69 19.8 
Greece  3.86 51.4 
Hungary  5.15 70.2 
Source: OECD. 
Table 4. Percentage of the population that has attained at 
least upper secondary education1, by age group 
Age group    
25-64 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 
Poland  45.9 51.7 47.5 44.5 36.4 
Portugal  19.9 32.5 19.9 13.6 8.5 
Greece  51.4 72.6 60.3 43.1 27.6 
Turkey  24.3 30.2 23.5 19.2 13.3 
Source: OECD. 
In terms of educational achievements, the picture is 
similar: there is only one member state that shows a worse 
performance. It is not surprising that it is Portugal which 
is showing signs of facing increasing difficulties in 
adapting to the increased competition in the internal 
market resulting from enlargement. The two new member 
countries, for which these internationally comparable data 
are available, Poland and Hungary, are both investing 
much more in education and set off from a much better 
starting point. Turkey is unique in having both a very low 
rate of investment in education and a bad starting point. 
The available data on enrolment rates and the educational 
attainment level of the younger generation indicate that 
the gap in terms of education is not about to be closed 
soon, even in the cohort that just entered the labour force 
(the 25-34 years old): less than a third has finished at least 
upper secondary education. In terms of investment in 
human capital Turkey will thus face a considerable 
handicap in a ‘convergence race’ with the new member 
countries. 
Duality 
Aggregate figures provide important information on 
national averages, but in the case of Turkey it becomes 
particularly important to look closer at sectoral and 
regional data because they reveal the existence of two 
economies. A large and poor agricultural (or rather rural) 
sector, and a modern sector that is at the level of the new 
member states. 
Table 5 below shows that Turkish average labour 
productivity (measured by value added per employed 
person) is close to that of the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland, the three biggest countries among the new 
EU members. This is so despite the fact that gross value 
added per person employed in agriculture lowers the 
Turkish average (with the exception of Poland in this 
case). Productivity in services, construction and, even 
more so in industry, is high in Turkey, when compared to 
the new member countries, reflecting the degree of 
modernity and sophistication reached by Turkey’s 
‘modern sector’. The situation looks even more ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TURKEY’S QUEST FOR EU MEMBERSHIP| 7 
favourable to Turkish industry when productivity levels 
are compared to Romania and Bulgaria, the two 
remaining candidate countries other than Turkey.  
Table 5. Sectoral gross value added per person employed, 
2000 (thousands of current euros) 
 Agriculture  Industry  Services  Economy
average 
Bulgaria 4.3  3.7  4.3  4.1 
Czech Rep.  9.7  12.4  12.1  11.7 
Hungary 7.6  12.0  12.1  11.5 
Poland 2.1  11.8 13.5 10.9 
Romania 1.1  5.8  7.5  4.2 
Turkey 4.6  13.5  15.7  10.9 
Source: EUROSTAT. 
These productivity comparisons show that the Turkish 
economy is not only on average ‘more developed’ than 
the economies of Romania and Bulgaria, but Turkish 
productivity outside agriculture is close to, or in some 
cases even higher than what we observe in the new 
member countries.  
The very large sectoral differences in productivity levels 
are also reflected in regional disparities as the modern, 
productive sector (mainly industry plus some services) is 
concentrated in a small number of regions in the western 
part of the country. The result being that the poorest 
regions produce less than one-fourth of the GDP per 
capita than the richer ones. 
4.  The outlook for growth 
Sustained rapid growth will be essential to create a 
positive background for the membership negotiations that 
might last for quite some time. If Turkey can start 
narrowing the gap in terms of GDP per capita over the 
next decade, the perception that the EU is about to take in 
‘yet another poor country’ will be weakened. Moreover, a 
booming economy will make it easier for Turkish policy-
makers to adopt all the domestic changes that will be 
required in the run-up to membership. But how do the 
factors discussed so far influence the outlook for growth? 
Over the last three years, Turkey has experienced a strong 
rebound, with growth rates in the 5-7% range. But how 
durable will this boom be? Can Turkey grow at these rates 
for the next decade? Assessing the longer-run growth 
prospects of the Turkish economy is rather difficult. Even 
a cursory examination of the Turkish growth record leads 
one back to the fundamental difficulty of judging the 
prospects of a country whose past performance has been 
so variable. Indeed one finds periods of extraordinary 
dynamism followed by deep slumps (and vice-versa) in 
both a longer-run and a shorter-run perspective. 
A first conclusion must thus be that that Turkey has a 
potential for strong growth, but that macroeconomic 
volatility has made sustained growth impossible so far. In 
other words – the patient must have a very strong 
constitution given that he has survived all the 
mistreatment administered over the past!  
Looking towards the future, all of the factors that 
inhibited growth during the last two decades should 
improve, especially if compared to the 1990s.  
In particular, the new economic and political anchor of 
the start of EU membership negotiations should ensure 
the consolidation of the structural and governance reforms 
undertaken in the 2001-03 period. In particular the 
consolidation of the deep reforms of the banking system 
and fiscal policy whose implementation has already 
started should now allow a growth path without episodes 
of financial collapse. Together with a medium-term 
membership perspective, this should encourage FDI flows 
of the order of 2-3% of GDP, helping to increase raise the 
investment rate in a sustainable way. A high investment 
rate would then allow Turkey to unlock its vast potential 
for extensive growth by drawing the remaining half of the 
population into its modern sector. Over time the 
qualification of the new entrants into the labour force 
could also increase considerably if the EU provides some 
financial support for Turkey’s own efforts in this area. 
What are the magnitudes of these factors? How fast could 
Turkey converge once the major impediment to growth, 
namely macroeconomic instability, has been removed?  
The accumulation of factors of production can take 
mainly three forms: investment in physical capital, 
investment in human capital and population growth. 
The strongest factor working in favour of Turkey is the 
demographic trend. The key point here is not the 
(declining) growth rate of the overall population, but the 
favourable evolution of its composition with an increasing 
proportion in working age. As illustrated above, this 
factor alone should lead to an increase in the potential 
GDP per capita of around 1.5% per annum over the next 
decade. As the proportion of the working age in overall 
population is not rising (in some cases it is actually falling 
due to ageing) in the EU-15, this factor should thus, on its 
own, allow Turkey’s GDP per capita to grow 1.5% per 
annum faster than that of the EU-15.  
Moreover, Turkey has the potential for large-scale 
absorption of underemployed labour, especially from the 
rural areas and among women, into higher-productivity 
activities in industry and services. 
Over a decade it should be possible that about a third of 
those currently employed at extremely low productivity 
rates in the rural areas will shift to industry and services. 
This would on its own constitute about 10% of the overall 
workforce. Although the productivity of these migrants 
from the rural areas might be somewhat lower than the 
existing workforce, this factor should provide for an 
additional increase in potential GDP per capita of almost 
1% per annum. This differentiates Turkey again from the 
eight CEECs of the class of 2004 and should thus allow 8 |DANIEL GROS 
for some narrowing of the difference in GDP per capita 
with respect to the new members. Only Romania shares 
with Turkey the potential of deriving substantial growth 
from the internal transfer of labour from low productivity 
to much higher productivity sectors. 
Drawing from the pool of those currently outside the 
workforce (mainly women) would provide an additional 
boost to growth. As documented above, only about 44% 
of the population in working age is currently employed in 
Turkey, compared to about 55%, on average, for the new 
member countries (and an even higher 64.4% for the EU-
15). Even if only one-half of the current difference 
between Turkey and the new member is eliminated over 
the next decade, this would mean an increase in the labour 
force of about 1% per annum. This factor could provide 
for another boost to GDP per capita of close to 1% per 
annum (less than 1% because the new entrants are likely 
to have a somewhat lower productivity than those already 
working). 
Finally, with an increasing transfer of technology 
(partially via higher FDI) total factor productivity should 
accelerate. For the new member countries one has 
observed over the last years that labour productivity has 
consistently increased by between 3 and 4% per annum. 
This is substantially more than the meagre 1-1.5% 
achieved by the EU-15. If Turkey were to match the 
performance of the new member countries (during their 
pre-accession period) in this respect, its TFP should grow 
faster than the EU by up to 2.5% per annum.  
What does this all add up to? If one compares Turkey to 
the EU-15 one finds that the total effect of all the growth-
enhancing factors could be between 3 and 6% per annum, 
suggesting that rapid convergence should be possible. 
Compared to the new member countries, Turkey would 
mainly have the labour supply working in its advantage, 
which sums up to somewhere between 1 and 3% per 
annum. This suggests that if Turkey were to be able to 
take full advantage of its potential labour supply, it might 
even catch up with respect to them. 
Table 6 below summarises this brief evaluation of the 
factors that should boost potential growth in Turkey, both 
compared to the EU-15 and to the new member countries. 
The arguments and data presented so far suggest that the 
biggest potential advantage of Turkey could be a better 
utilisation of its human resources.  
What does the illustrative quantification of the growth 
boosting factors imply for convergence? Dervis et al. 
(2004) in a contribution to the CEPS project on Turkey 
pursue two approaches, which come to a similar result: 
within the next decade the gap in GDP per capita could be 
substantially narrowed so that by the time of its potential 
accession Turkey could have about the same GDP per 
capita in relation to the EU-27 as the new member 
countries had when they joined in 2004. Over an even 
longer perspective, say up to the year 2025 (when 
transition periods for the full mobility of labour might 
expire), GDP per capita in PPP terms might increase from 
the present 25% to about 60% of the EU-15 (the likely 
target for migration). 
5. Migration 
The starting assumption of any discussion on this point 
should be that it is likely that Turkey will not be treated 
any better than the recent new member states in terms of 
labour mobility. The incumbent EU-15 member states 
gave themselves the possibility to keep their labour 
markets closed to workers from the new member states 
for potentially up to 7 years after accession (2 plus 3 plus 
2 years). When Portugal and Spain acceded, the transition 
periods were even longer. Only 11 years after accession 
did Luxembourg have to lift restriction on the movement 
of workers from Portugal. If Turkey accedes by, say, 2015 
the full mobility of workers might thus come only in 18-
20 years, or possibly even later.  
By that time EU labour markets will reflect strongly the 
progressive ageing of the population (not only among the 
EU-15, but also the new members). By that time there 
might thus be actually labour shortages, instead of the 
widespread unemployment that is still the rule today. 
Moreover, if Turkey has progressed well in the 
convergence process, it might no longer be so attractive 
for Turkish workers to emigrate. For all these reasons it 
does not make sense to speculate how many Turkish 
workers might move to the EU-15 using today’s labour 
market data. 
 
 
Table 6. Factors boosting potential growth in GDP per capita (in % per annum) 
  Turkey compared to EU-15  Turkey compared to new members 
Higher proportion in working age  1.0 - 1.5  0.5 – 1.0 
Transfers from rural sector to industry and services  0.5 – 1.0  0.5 – 1.0 
Increasing labour force participation rate  0.5 – 1.0  0 - 0.5 
Total factor productivity (TFP)  1.0 – 2.5  0 – 0.5 
Sum total  3.0 – 6.0  1.0 – 3.0 
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Moreover, in the debate about Turkish EU membership 
and free movement of labour it is often overlooked that 
the EU cannot exercise a zero migration policy even if 
permanent safeguards were used. Even under the 
currently prevailing strict regime, there is an annual net 
migration from Turkey to the EU-15 in the order of 
35,000 people. This net figure is the difference between a 
gross inflow of about 70,000 and an outflow of about 
35,000. Any slowdown or suspension in Turkey’s 
accession process is likely to lead to lower growth and 
higher unemployment in Turkey. Moreover, the reform 
process might slow down or be partially reversed. The 
consequence of such a combination would be felt on both 
sides: through presumably larger gross inflows and fewer 
people wanting to return to Turkey. As a result a 
drastically higher number of net migrants would be 
finding their way into the EU – as experience has shown 
irrespective of legal restriction. It is thus possible that if 
Turkey loses the membership perspective, the EU may 
end up having more immigrants than under a free 
movement of labour regime with a prosperous EU 
member Turkey. Moreover, the composition of this 
migration would be less conducive for the EU labour 
markets – and for integration in the host societies. 
The experiences of Greece, Portugal and Spain indicate 
that a successful accession period with high growth and 
effective implementation of the reforms reduces and 
gradually eliminates the migration pressures. There is no 
a priori reason why Turkey would not go through a 
similar experience. How quickly Turkey would graduate 
from the status of strong emigration is impossible to say 
at this point. But it appears clear that the only scenario 
under which there would be an open-ended process of 
large-scale emigration is the one of an unstable Turkey 
outside the EU.  
6. Concluding  remarks 
‘Health not wealth’ should be the decisive criterion when 
considering the prospects of Turkey's application for EU 
membership. Viewed this way, the outlook is promising. 
Turkey is still very poor, compared to the present EU 
members, but is also more dynamic. Full catch-up in 
terms of GDP per capita might take more than a 
generation, rather than years, but full catch-up is not the 
relevant criterion if one is concerned about the impact of 
the accession of Turkey on the EU. Experience has shown 
that problems are much more likely to arise from 
established rich member countries with stagnant 
economies (Belgium in the 1980s, Italy and Germany 
today) than from initially poor, but more dynamic states 
(e.g. Ireland today). The fact that most of the so-called 
‘periphery’ is now growing more strongly than the ‘core’ 
confirms that within an enlarged EU the poorer member 
countries are likely to prosper and thus cause fewer 
problems than widely anticipated. 
Turkey should now be able to embark on a sustained 
period of convergence which should reduce the huge 
differential in GDP per capita of today to a more 
(politically) acceptable level by the time Turkey joins the 
EU. This optimism is not based on the growth 
performance of the Turkish economy over the last decade, 
which has been rather weak. We observe that the 
macroeconomic instability over the last decade has been 
so severe that it is actually surprising that there has been 
any growth at all. With macroeconomic stability and with 
the negotiations process providing an anchor for the 
political system, these vital forces should now come to the 
forefront.  
 
References 
Derviş, Kemal, Daniel Gros, Faik Öztrak, Fırat Bayar and 
Yusuf Işık (2004), Relative Income Growth and 
Convergence, CEPS EU-Turkey Working Paper No. 
8, September.  
Quaisser, W. and A. Reppegather (2004), EU-
Beitrittsreife der Turkei und Konsequenzen einer 
EU-Mitgliedschaft, Working Paper No. 252, 
Osteuropa-Institut, Munich. 
 
  
C  E 
P  S 
 
CENTRE FOR 
EUROPEAN 
POLICY 
STUDIES 
Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels 
Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ Fax: (32.2) 219.41.51 
www.ceps.be ▪ info@ceps.be 
 
W
e
b
s
i
t
e
:
 
w
w
w
.
c
e
p
s
.
b
e
 
 
 
 
B
o
o
k
s
h
o
p
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
s
h
o
p
.
c
e
p
s
.
b
e
 
 
 
 
About CEPS 
Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research 
institute dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from 
official institutions (European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and 
national bodies), foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
Goals 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public 
events. 
Assets and Achievements 
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to 
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to 
climate change, JHA and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with 
extensive working experience in EU affairs. 
Programme Structure 
CEPS is a place where creative and authoritative specialists reflect and comment on the problems 
and opportunities facing Europe today. This is evidenced by the depth and originality of its 
publications and the talent and prescience of its expanding research staff. The CEPS research 
programme is organised under two major headings: 
Economic Policy  Politics, Institutions and Security 
Macroeconomic Policy  The Future of Europe 
European Network of Economic Policy  Justice and Home Affairs 
    Research Institutes (ENEPRI)  The Wider Europe 
Financial Markets, Company Law & Taxation  South East Europe 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI)  Caucasus & Black Sea 
Trade Developments & Policy  EU-Russian/Ukraine Relations 
Energy, Environment & Climate Change   Mediterranean & Middle East 
Agricultural Policy  CEPS-IISS European Security Forum 
In addition to these two sets of research programmes, the Centre organises a variety of activities 
within the CEPS Policy Forum. These include CEPS task forces, lunchtime membership meetings, 
network meetings abroad, board-level briefings for CEPS corporate members, conferences, training 
seminars, major annual events (e.g. the CEPS International Advisory Council) and internet and 
media relations. 